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Abstract 
 
 
The proportion of women and ethnic minorities in senior management remains indefensibly 
low.  Radical ideas are therefore needed.  This paper proposes one.  It is to use a form of 
selective randomness -- random selection from among a pool of pre-chosen and qualified 
candidates -- as a new HRM tool.  We argue this in two parts – an equity case and an efficiency 
case.  First, selective randomness would ensure greater equity between the sexes and races over 
time; offer ‘rejection insurance’ to candidates wary of discrimination, and thereby mitigate the 
fear of failure; and encourage women and non-whites to enter tournaments.  Second, we 
consider also the criterion of efficiency.  The standard of candidates going into management 
would be raised; homophily would be reduced, thus improving diversity of people and ideas, 
and reducing the ‘chosen one’ factor.  By using Jensen’s inequality from applied mathematics, 
we provide the first demonstration that random selection could act to improve organizational 
efficiency by raising the chance of an extraordinary manager being hired. 
 
 
Keywords: Leadership, women, ethnicity, diversity, random selection.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
  
 The call from global corporations for diversity in management is ubiquitous (e.g. 
Chevron, and Procter and Gamble, see Catalyst Group, 2015).  Yet white men continue to be 
greatly overrepresented at the top of all kinds of hierarchies (Blau & Kahn, 2006; Lyness & 
Heilman, 2006; Leslie, King, Bradley & Hebl, 2008; Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2011; Ely, 
Ibarra & Kolb, 2011; Joshi, Son, & Roh, 2015; Leslie, Manchester & Dahm, 2017).  The gender 
and race gap persists even though the landscape has been altered in several ways.  Notably, 
diversity education and training has been widely introduced, since it became clear that 
discrimination comes at a high cost (e.g. Bezrukova, Jehn & Spell, 2012).  In educational 
achievement, there is now a reverse gender-gap; school girls outperform boys in many subjects 
(Goldin, Katz & Kuziemko, 2006; OECD, 2015), and most college graduates in OECD 
countries are now female (Dawson, Kersley & Natella, 2014).  Women and non-whites are 
more equally present in the workplace (Burns, Barton, & Kerby, 2012; Hekman, Johnson, Foo, 
& Yang, 2017), and there exists an indiscernible performance gap compared with white men.  
In examining a number of studies over 30 years, Joshi and colleagues concluded that sex 
differences in rewards were 14 times larger than sex differences in performance evaluations 
(Joshi, Son, & Roh, 2015).  In contrast there is growing evidence that female representation in 
top management is associated with organizational performance (Dawson, Kersley & Natella, 
2014; Paustian-Underdahl,Walker &Woehr, 2014), the pursuit of innovative strategies (Deszö 
& Ross, 2012), and more stable leadership in turbulent times (Rost & Osterloh, 2010).   
 This persistent gap in power is not merely inequitable -- it is also inefficient.  Thus, new 
ideas are apparently needed.  Here we propose one: it is to incorporate partly random selection 
(what we call selective randomness) from among a qualified pool of candidates into hiring 
practices for middle managers.  
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 In this conceptual paper we explore why and how to apply a form of random selection 
as a tool to raise the number of candidates for middle management positions who are female or 
from ethnic minorities.  First, we summarize to what extent random selection has been 
discussed in historical settings.  Next, we present the equity case for selective randomness; for 
example, it may be used to encourage women and non-whites to enter tournaments, it offers 
‘rejection insurance’ to those who fail, and, importantly, random selection can ensure equality 
of gender and race in management over time.  Next, we present the efficiency case for selective 
randomness:  how random selection might raise the standard of middle management candidates, 
reduce homophily to improve diversity of people and ideas, and lessen ‘the chosen one’ factor 
of hubris often common among leaders.  Finally, we demonstrate how random selection can 
improve organizational efficiency using Jensen’s inequality from applied mathematics. 
 Random selection has a long though little-known history.  It was successfully applied 
in ancient Athens and the “golden times” of Venice.  Recently the idea has gained some 
attention in management research (Zeitoun, Osterloh & Frey, 2014; Liu & De Rond, 2016). We 
acknowledge that it is an unfamiliar concept; however, far-reaching ideas may be necessary to 
break the current deadlock.  We offer a proposition that can be tested in organizations as well 
as in laboratory experiments.    
 
2. AN INTRODUCTION TO RANDOM SELECTION 
 
 Random selection is rarely featured as a decision-making mechanism in business 
processes or the management literature (for an exception, see Zeitoun, Osterloh, & Frey, 2014).  
We are proposing that it should be used as a tool to select middle managers and mid-tier leaders 
out of a pre-selected pool.  A key idea is that women and ethnic minorities may be more likely 
to enter the pool of candidates if the final selection mechanism is viewed as unbiased.   Random 
selection helps psychologically to reduce the element of competition.  Identity costs -- for 
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example being disliked, or being punished by candidates who were not selected -- are avoided; 
non-winners in random selection do not lose face.   
Random selection has been around for a long time.  It was first used as a political 
mechanism by the ancient Athenians and Venetians over two and a half thousand years ago 
(Buchstein & Jörke, 2007; Buchstein, 2010; Frey and Steiner, 2014; Zeitoun, Osterloh & Frey, 
2014; Van Reybrouck, 2016).  In the 18th century, the University of Basel appointed professors 
by drawing lots from among the top three candidates, thus helping to induce the most reputable 
individuals to stand for office (Burckhardt 1916; Stolz, 1986).  A recent study in a similar 
setting examined the academic hiring process in four Italian universities after random selection 
was introduced; the authors found that candidates increased in number and the share of women 
rose (Checchi, De Poli & Rettore, 2017).  Although its use has greatly declined, some 
institutions still use an element of randomness.  For example, the Amish choose their leaders 
by random selection, and it is commonly adopted as a mechanism to select juries or decide 
tiebreaks in national and local elections (Zeitoun, Osterloh & Frey, 2014).   
 We focus on middle managers for three reasons.  First, to reduce the gender and race 
gap at the top, we must first populate the middle.  Second, and importantly, middle managers 
have been shown to be influential.  They are essential in shaping and implementing people 
management practices (McConville & Holden, 1999; Purcell & Hutchinson, 2007).  Employee 
attitudes, such as commitment and job satisfaction (Purcell & Hutchinson, 2007; Bäker & 
Goodall, 2017), and engagement and employee performance (Alfes, Truss, Soane, Rees & 
Gatenby, 2013), have been linked to the people management practices of middle managers.  
Finally, innovative techniques, such as the one suggested here, may currently be more 
acceptable and likely to gain approval for appointment into middle ranking positions rather than 
into CEO positions.  
 For this approach to work, an important requirement is the organization’s commitment 
to adopt selective randomness over a significant period.  Under a procedure of random 
 5 
 
selection, time will be necessary to ensure that there is equal representation of gender and other 
minorities, encourage people to throw their hat into the ring, and make possible an analysis of 
individual and firm performance.   
 In the next section, we outline the possible ‘prizes’ from a random process of hiring, 
and then we explain the necessary stages prior to throwing the hypothetical dice. 
 
3. RANDOM SELECTION AS A SUPPLY-SIDE TOOL: THE EQUITY CASE  
 3.1 Greater gender and racial equality over time 
 First, and of most relevance to this paper, random decisions can lead to egalitarian 
outcomes because they produce real representativeness in the population (McCormick, 2006).  
Groups, based on gender or ethnicity, are represented according to their significance in the 
general population (Frey & Steiner, 2014).  Random sampling is used in national surveys for 
this reason.  Random processes can reduce the power of interest groups that seek to influence 
political decisions by corrupt means (Hayek, 1979).  If equal proportions are put into the pot 
then the ‘law of large numbers’ predicts that over time equality between white men, women 
and non-whites can be met using a process of random selection.   For example, the predicted 
outcome is 50% chance of a male and 50% chance of a female (this generalizes to the group 
seeking more representation with the appropriate adjustment for their probabilities in the 
population).  As suggested above, commitment to the process over time will ensure that the 
participating organisation benefits from gender or ethnic diversity and other forms of 
variability, such as personality, sexuality, creativity and talent (discussed further below).   
 
 3.2 Random selection offers ‘rejection insurance’ 
 The first step towards winning a competition is to enter.  We believe that random 
selection may encourage women and non-whites to more liberally throw their hat into 
leadership and management ring.  Evidence suggests that women lack confidence compared 
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with men in certain circumstances (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1982; Beyer, 1990; 
Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Kay & Shipman, 2014).  A tournament-entry gap exists between 
males and females mainly driven by women’s preference not to compete, and also lower levels 
of self-confidence (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). If men and women are equally confident it 
has been found that there are no gender differences in competitive entry.  This has been shown 
in the laboratory (Prize, 2010) as well as in the field (Garrat, Weinberger & Johnson, 2013). 
 Years of overt and covert discrimination might predispose women and minorities to be 
psychologically wary of entering competitions and more likely to suffer psychologically from 
failure or rejection (e.g. Steele, Spencer & Aronson, 2002).  Opting to compete for management 
and leadership positions requires both self-confidence and confidence in the system to run fair 
tournaments.    
Stereotype threat is a situation in which individuals are anxious to behave according to 
negative stereotypes about their social group which hinders their ability to perform at a high 
level. This may be the case even if the individual does not subscribe to the stereotype (Schmader 
& Johns, 2005; Inzlicht, 2011; Flore & Wicherts, 2015).  An important feature of random 
selection is that it acts as ‘rejection insurance’ against these factors to moderate the stereotype 
threat effect (e.g. Steele, Spencer & Aronson, 2002; Rosette, Koval, Ma & Livingston, 2016).    
It does so in two key ways: first, throwing a dice makes the process balanced and open, and, 
therefore, not susceptible to undue influence through networks and interest groups, homophily 
or corruption, which will allow the process to induce greater trust.   Second, if a candidate loses, 
he or she cannot ‘blame themselves’ for not winning, thus reducing the likelihood of 
internalizing failure into one’s self-perception.   This rejection insurance also arguably protects 
against any personal pressures enhanced through racial or gender stereotype and social identity 
threats.   
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4. RANDOM SELECTION: THE CASE FOR EFFICIENCY 
4.1 Random selection encourages new talent and reduces homophily 
Selecting people randomly may encourages new talent to enter the pool, especially those 
as mentioned above, who may be less inclined to enter competitions or elections because of low 
confidence or risk aversion (Beckmann & Menkhoff, 2008; Zeitoun, Osterloh, and Frey, 2014).   
Random selection also protects against homophily – hiring in one’s own image.  A diverse 
talent pool will generate diversity of ideas and decisions (Fishkin & Farrar, 2005; Jeppesen & 
Lakhani, 2010).  It may also lead to a ‘balanced portfolio’ by spreading risks as different kinds 
of people (and personalities) will be randomly selected (Zeitoun, Osterloh & Frey, 2014).   
  
 4.2 Random selection reduces ‘the chosen one’ factor 
If random selection offers rejection insurance to protect women and ethnic minorities 
against internalizing failure, it also protects against the possibility of white men to overly 
internalize the positive influence of winning.  Women are more likely than men to integrate 
negative feedback and less likely to incorporate positive information into their self-perception 
(Roberts & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1989; Dweck, 2000; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Women are 
prone to attribute their success to luck than to their own performance (Beyer, 1990; Felder, 
Felder, Mauney, Hamrin & Dietz, 1995). Overconfidence in men is well documented 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Beyer 1990; Kay & Shipman, 2014) and it can be 
more pronounced when men undertake tasks that are considered to be masculine (Moore & 
Small, 2004); arguably men may consider leadership as such a task.    
The characteristic of ‘hubris’ is often associated with organizational leaders (Hayward 
& Hambrick, 1997; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005).  Individuals who regularly win tournaments 
may start to believe that they are ‘the chosen one’.   Serial winners may overly-attribute their 
success to personal talent and under-represent the role of chance.  An over confidence in one’s 
ability could result in homogeneity of ideas and decision-making, because too much weight is 
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placed on one’s own opinions and less on others.  This may be further enforced by hiring the 
fabled ‘yes men’ into the team.   
The contrasting characteristic of ‘humility’ is viewed as being desirable in managers 
and leaders (Sally, 2002; Van Buren & Safferstone, 2009; Bridgewater, Kahn, & Goodall, 
2011).  Choosing managers by random selection will likely protect against ‘the chosen one’ 
factor and may engender greater humility and collegiality because of the greater weight placed 
on chance.  
Thus, random processing can be used in many settings to correct and improve different 
kinds of procedures.  Zeitoun, Osterloh, and Frey (2014) propose developing a corporate 
governance model using random selection procedures to appoint stakeholder representatives to 
corporate boards.  Pluchino, Rapisarda & Garofalo (2011) suggest using partial random 
selection as a promotion strategy that protects again the Peter Principle. 
 
4.3 Random selection improves organizational performance – an application of 
 Jensen’s Inequality1  
There is another, although little known, argument for random selection. A conceptual 
idea originating from the Danish mathematician Johan Jensen helps us understand how the 
random selection of managers (of either sex) might also contribute to organizational 
performance.  Known today as ‘Jensen’s Inequality2’ (Jensen, 1906), the mathematical idea 
describes the case when randomness is or is not desirable.  The idea behind Jensen’s Inequality 
can be conveyed in a numerical illustration.  More generally, it is based on concepts of 
convexity and concavity in real-line mathematical analysis.  
Imagine a world in which there are three kinds of leader or manager candidates.  They 
come in three qualities: ‘poor’, ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’.  Assume that a selection panel can 
                                                        
1 Thanks to Andrew Oswald for discussions on this topic.  
2 Jensen’s inequality exploits the mathematical fact that a chord always lies above a convex curve.  
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always identify the good safe candidate, but that it is hard for the panel to distinguish between 
those who are poor and those who are outstanding (the latter may tend to look risky, ex ante).   
Thus, the safe outcome for the organisation can always be achieved by selecting the middle-
quality manager, namely the one described here as good.  Imagine, as in Table 1a, this produces 
for the organization the sales revenue total of $3 million.   
What happens if random selection is used instead?  The advantage of this is that it creates 
an averaging effect.  Over time, outstanding outcomes can outweigh the poor outcomes.  This 
avoids the problem of repeatedly safe outcomes.   
There are different cases.  We begin with a benchmark example in which random 
selection is neither beneficial nor harmful.  Following Table 1a, the proportional case, if the 
candidates are randomly drawn then one third of the time the manager will turn out to be poor 
and generate $2 million revenue, and one third of the time the manager will be good and lead 
to $3 million, and one third of the time the candidate will be outstanding and will produce $4 
million revenue.  On average, therefore, it is possible to see that the organisation will produce 
revenue of $3 million by using randomization.  This is because the organisation gets an even 
spread of candidates through time.  Put arithmetically, this is simply saying that (2 + 3 + 4) / 3 
= 3.  In this setting, therefore, where the success for the organisation depends in a smooth way 
on the quality of managers, random selection produces on average the same result as continually 
picking the safe candidate.  Both strategies produce $3 million on average.  Here, random 
selection would have no special advantage.   
In some instances, however, it is plausible to think that outstanding managers have 
special multiplying effects on the success of organisations.  In this kind of situation, getting a 
high-quality manager, even occasionally, could be disproportionally important to the 
organisation.  Table 1b is an illustration (this, mathematically, is the case of convexity).  Now 
the argument for random selection is particularly strong.  The exponential case suggests that if 
the candidates are randomly drawn then one third of the time the manager will turn out to be 
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poor and generate $2 million revenue; a third of the time the manager will be good, which 
generates $3 million; and a third of the time the candidate will be outstanding and will generate 
$5 million revenue.  Here, it is the nonlinearity -- the jump to 5 million -- that is the key. The 
organisation continues under random selection to get an even spread of candidates through time 
-- arithmetically, this is merely (2 + 3 + 5) / 3 = 3.33.  But in this setting the organisation gets, 
on average, 11% higher revenue by exploiting the tool of randomization.  Random selection is 
optimal here because the occasional ‘error’ (appointing a weak manager) is more than 
outweighed by the occasional superb appointment of a manager who takes risks and earns large 
rewards for the organization.  
The purpose of the table and this numerical illustration is to try to explain a wider point.  
When the success of an organisation depends in an accelerating way (that is, mathematically, 
in a convex way) on managerial quality then there are potential benefits from the use of random 
selection.  Arguably, such settings are also plausible ones, because managers have unusually 
disproportionate effects on their entire organization.  Leaders’ decisions can have greatly 
multiplied consequences.    
 
4.4 Using random selection to encourage the reluctant leader 
 An additional benefit to random selection is pertinent in knowledge intensive firms.  It 
is common in organisations where the core workers are experts and professionals, such as in 
professional service firms, to find an unwillingness to take up management positions (Empson 
& Langley, 2015).  An offer to include candidates through a random process may encourage 
involvement; it may also act as a conscious-clearing exercise; ‘at least I have showed willing 
by entering myself into the competition’.   
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5. THE PRACTICE OF RANDOM SELECTION AS A TOOL FOR HRM 
 5.1 Entry to the short-list 
As has been suggested, random selection is best utilized as a method for hiring middle 
managers. Success will require an investment in time, in training and in the selection of 
appropriate candidates onto a short-list.  Only once the short-list has been constructed should a 
process of random selection be used.   
There are two possible ways that random selection could be executed.  The first 
approach is random selection from a short-list in which there may not be an equal number of 
men, women and ethnically diverse candidates.  Random selection would then, on average, 
replicate the same white male-female ratio that existed on the short-list, but could not then 
guarantee equality by gender or ethnicity.  The second approach by design, is made up from the 
start with an agreed number of men, women and non-white candidates.  In this latter case, a 
quota would be required.   
Affirmative action and positive discrimination measures such as quotas are used in 
many countries to mitigate gender or racial bias.  Quotas are sometimes put in place by 
governments or voluntarily adopted when other forms of encouragement or self-regulation have 
failed to alter gender or ethnic distributions (Krook, 2005; Dahlerup, 2006; Ryan, Haslam, 
Morgenroth, Rink, Stoker & Peters 2016; Sojo, Wood, Wood & Wheeler, 2016).   A recent 
high-profile example is the requirement for all boards of public companies in Norway to include 
at least 40% women.  An attempt by the UK government to impose a voluntary obligation of 
25% female board membership on all public companies by 2015 marginally failed (only 20% 
was met)3. 
The first of the above approaches to selection into the pool involves conventional 
procedures; for example, the position may be advertised internally, or a committee may choose, 
                                                        
3 Adams (2016) believes more research is needed to fully understand the benefits of board diversity. 
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or managers might ‘tap the shoulders’ of potential candidates and encourage them to consider 
the position.   Under this condition one could hope that ample gender and racial diversity would 
be facilitated but there would be no rule on numbers.  The evidence suggests that under these 
conditions talented women and non-whites may be more likely to apply, and the perception of 
“reverse discrimination” and the crowding out of high-performing men will be reduced.  Out 
of this pool, a random selection of the chosen candidate would eventually be made.   
The second method of selection would be to use a gender- race-based quota system to 
ensure that there are the same number of male, female and non-white candidates in the pool: 
this may be 1x1x1, 2x2, or higher.  Some organisations may lack ethnic representation more 
than gender and vice versa.  Quotas seem empirically to work; they change the landscape by 
raising the profile of diversity and, concomitantly, increase female and non-white 
representation in the public and commercial sectors, without negatively affecting productivity 
(Jones, 2004; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Powley, 2007; Balafoutas & Sutter, 2012; 
Niederle et al., 2014; Beaman, Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2009).    
Irrespective of which method of selection is chosen, candidates who enter the pool 
should, we believe, be approximately equal in their rank or position in the organisation and 
have equal approximate ability.  This will help to ensure against potential ‘glass cliff’ scenarios 
(Ryan & Haslam, 2005; Ryan, Haslam, Morgenroth, Rink, Stoker, J. & Peters 2016), where, 
for example, women are inappropriately picked for a task and therefore fail -- a situation that 
increases negative stereotyping. The level of management knowledge and experience may vary 
between candidates, but this is not uncommon in any promotion.  Inevitably, contestants’ 
personalities will differ. However, importantly, applicants should have extensive knowledge of 
the core business of the organisation (Goodall, 2011; Goodall & Baker, 2014).    
Incentives may be necessary to attract candidates into the pool at the outset.  Women 
and ethnic minorities in particular may lack trust in the organizational hierarchy based on its 
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previous behavior.   Adequate management and leadership training and professional coaching 
should be available to candidates; this is we believe is important.  
 
5.2 Randomly selecting into the post 
 Once the short-list has been finalized – whether by conventional methods of selection 
or through a quota system that guarantees equality of gender and race – the random selection 
of the candidate can occur.  Trust is an important factor to ensure.  Therefore, the process needs 
to be regulated and should happen in a public or semi-public setting.   
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The tide has not turned for women or ethnic minorities in leadership.  Indeed, it might be 
argued that numbers remain inexcusably low.  For women and non-whites to become leaders, 
they must first become middle managers.  Firms committed to diversity could choose to use 
affirmative action as a demand-side tool to ensure women are placed into management 
positions.  However, this has associated costs.  Unrepresented groups may be made to feel that 
they acquired the job merely because of their gender or race, and men may view it as unfair 
“reverse discrimination”, or another form of overt interest-group influence.  Moreover, high-
performing men may be crowded-out.  Thus, affirmative action could result in the persistence 
of women’s and ethnic minority’s negative (self-)stereotyping with the attendant “identity 
costs”.    
      In this paper, we consider the introduction of an unusual supply-side measure to encourage 
women and diverse groups into management.  We propose a new solution based on the use of 
random selection from among a pool of pre-chosen candidates. This might be called selective 
randomness.  
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 The paper suggests that random selection could encourage more women and non-whites to 
throw their hat into the management ring because, in a sense, it avoids competitive fear within 
the ring.   Crucially, we believe that random selection at the second stage would increase 
individuals’ willingness to allow their names to go onto the short-list at the first stage, 
particularly those who may suffer from stereotype and social-identity threats.  As a 
consequence, it mitigates the “identity costs” of falling “out of role” and offers “rejection 
insurance” against failure.   
Choosing candidates fairly, through a type of random selection, also levels the field by 
reducing the influence of white male networks -- the psychologically safe options -- that often 
support men into and during promotion4.  It also protects against the propensity for managers 
to feel that they are “the chosen one”, thus encouraging greater humility and collegiality.  We 
also explain above that the purported disadvantage of random selection -- of not identifying the 
most appropriate person -- needs to be balanced by considerations that “rational” selection 
processes are flawed, and that, under certain conditions, random selection can contribute in the 
long run to organizational performance.  This latter point can be captured using a conceptual 
application of the mathematical theorem known as “Jensen’s inequality”. 
This paper has limitations that offer opportunities for future research.  First, there is 
apparently little or no empirical evidence on the effects of random selection in the field of race 
or gender policy. Such evidence is by necessity restricted because the application of random 
selection in this field is currently an unusual idea. Future endeavors may apply various 
methodologies to gather empirical evidence, starting with laboratory experiments and vignette 
studies, and continuing to in-depth case studies of real-world implementations.  
Second, although random selection of management candidates represents a generic 
concept, its adoption needs to take into account the cultural subtleties in different countries.  
                                                        
4 In a study of academic hiring practices in 4 Italian universities, Checchi, De Poli & Rettore (2017) find that 
insider networks are reduced when random selection is used.  
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For instance, random selection procedures are likely to be accepted more readily in cultures 
that emphasize equality of opportunities. Where cultural beliefs associate random selection with 
“irrationality”, it may be helpful to emphasize the instrumental benefits of random selection 
procedures, especially when compared to conventional selection procedures that are often only 
partially “rational”.  
Although the idea of selective randomness put forward in this paper may seem 
unconventional, we believe that the time is ripe for radical endeavors.  It is clear that the gender 
and race gap is proving difficult to close.  We hope our proposed innovation might be viewed 
as an opportunity.   
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TABLE 1 
 
An illustration of the theoretical case for random selection and how it depends  
on the output consequences of different kinds of leaders or managers  
(an application of Jensen’s Inequality) 
 
Table 1a 
The simple proportional case* 
        
Leader/manager type Organisational output 
Poor 2 million revenue 
Good 3 million revenue 
Outstanding 4 million revenue 
 
*In this case, leaders have smooth linear effects on the success of the organisation.  
 
Table 1b 
The exponential case** 
 
Leader/manager type Organisational output 
Poor 2 million revenue 
Good 3 million revenue 
Outstanding 5 million revenue 
 
**In this case, leaders have highly accelerating effects on the success of the organisation. 
Strictly speaking, the correct adjective (mathematically) would be ‘convex’ rather than 
exponential, but we use ‘exponential’ because it may be more widely understood. 
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